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BOOK REVIEW
Chinese and Buddhist philosophy in early twentieth-century German thought, by
Eric S. Nelson, London, Bloomsbury Academic, $114.00 (hardcover),
ISBN: 9781350002562
Eric Nelson has written a very comprehensive study of the reception of Chinese and Eastern
Buddhist philosophy in Western thought, with a special focus on the German thinkers of the
early twentieth century. Nelson shows great erudition in bringing together a wide variety of
thinkers from both East and West, including importantly some lesser known, but very relevant
thinkers from both the Western tradition and Eastern philosophy. Although Nelson focuses
mostly on the encounters and interactions between German philosophers and Chinese thin-
kers, his aim with this commendable book is wider. Nelson employs the encounters
between German and Chinese thinkers in the wider context of comparative and/or intercul-
tural philosophy, and his aim is therefore stated as being an attempt to consider ‘whether a
more nuanced and historically appropriate conception of philosophy can emerge through cri-
tically engaging and reflecting on the modern encounter between Western and non-Western
philosophy, and articulating its intercultural and intertextual dynamics’ (11–12).
As so many of us comparative or intercultural philosophers, Nelson sees the need to expand
the notion of philosophy from its narrow confines of Western rationality and metaphysics. In
the chapters of this book he uses the various case studies of encounters between Western and
Eastern thinkers to espouse what intercultural philosophy (and therefore philosophy in
general) should be. In Chapter 1 the mixed batch of positive and negative receptions of Con-
fucius in German thought is examined through such thinkers as Rosenzweig, Misch, and Buber
amongst others. In Chapter 2 the figure of Zhang Dumai is discussed, who adopted both
(Neo-) Confucian visions and the life-philosophy of the German thinkers Eucken and
Driesch in an attempt to negotiate the Westernization of thinking in China with the perceived
merits of Confucian thought. In Chapter 3 the issue of ‘resentment’ is discussed through the
figures of Nietzsche, Scheler, and Confucius, and Nelson argues that an approach through
Confucian ethics to this problem provides an illuminating alternative well worth considering.
In Chapter 4 the focus is switched to the reception and appropriation of Daoism in early twen-
tieth-century Germany, discussing amongst others primarily Heidegger and Buber. Nelson
here shows how a range of key philosophical ideas of both thinkers were informed by the
figures of Laozi and Zhuangzi. Chapter 5 turns the discussion towards the origins of philos-
ophy. By exploring how Heidegger, Dilthey, and Misch interpret the very idea and origin of
philosophy, Nelson comes to the conclusion that there is a camp which considers philosophy
to be a largely Western enterprise from a Western starting point, but there is also a camp in
German thought which, although in flawed ways, argues for a more pluralistic conception of
the origins of philosophy, and is thereby more conducive to intercultural philosophy.
In Chapters 6–8 Nelson turns his attention to (mostly East-Asian) Buddhism. Chapter 6,
building on the previous chapter, discusses how although Husserl and Heidegger had some
promising engagements with East-Asian Buddhism, their perceptions on and limitations of
what philosophy is has hindered a full development of such engagements. Chapter 7 again dis-
cusses Buber and Heidegger, this time in light of Buber’s idea that the West can learn from the
East, and specifically from East-Asian Buddhism. The discussion here focuses on how such
learning from the East might be perceived by Buber and Heidegger, and emphasizes
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specifically the predicaments of Western technological modernity, which both Buber and Hei-
degger identified as areas where Eastern thought in general, and Chan/Zen Buddhism in par-
ticular, might provide resources for the alleviation of such predicaments. In the last chapter of
this book, the Chan Buddhist notion of emptiness is compared to Heidegger’s Nothing. Nelson
here discusses how both notions, although in different ways, ‘indicate strategies of self-trans-
formation within the worldly immanence of everyday life through employing the perplexing
and transformative language of emptiness and nothingness’ (22).
As can be glanced from this description of the chapters, in which I have not even mentioned
all the thinkers that Nelson discusses, this book is commendable for its vast erudition. Just
mentioning the names of the thinkers that Nelson discusses would make this review intoler-
ably long. Nelson has done the discipline of comparative and/or intercultural philosophy a
huge service by not limiting his discussions to the most well-known figures, but by enlarging
the discourse through his elucidations of the many and diverse figures who have played a role
in shaping comparative and intercultural philosophy into the discipline it is today.
Although the topic is discussed in various places throughout the book, in the conclusion
Nelson comes back to the idea of intercultural philosophy. He argues that a contemporary her-
meneutical approach to intercultural philosophy is needed that would realize that intercultural
encounters have happened and continue to happen and that such encounters need to move
away from ideas of inferiority or superiority. This obviously entails a critique of Eurocentric
notions of what philosophy is or should be, and Nelson argues that a recognition of the
inherent rationality and potential for philosophical reflection in other cultures is still badly
needed, although that recognition should not lead us into a shallow relativism.
While there is a lot to commend about this book, I do wish to point out certain minor areas
that I find problematic. Sometimes Nelson seems to be overplaying his cards or overgeneralizing
or simplifying matters. It may be that such is a necessary feature of a work that covers so many
different thinkers, but it should be addressed anyway. I will therefore highlight two instances.
The first is in the chapter on ‘resentment.’ While Nelson does an admirable job in nuancing
Nietzsche’s ideas on resentment and ressentiment, he then goes on to argue that the Confucian
asymmetrical relationality is in fact a better way of dealing with the negative emotions of resent-
ment. But the question that is not answered here is whether it is not in fact the asymmetry in the
first place that is the cause for resentment, as it may well be that the demand of prioritization of
the ‘other’ in the self-development of the Confucian ethics is at least part of the cause of resent-
ment, rather than its cure as suggested by Nelson. Although Nelson may be right in suggesting
that Confucian ethics provide an alternative approach to Western social theories of resentment
in urging the moral person to stand above resentment through a prioritization of the standpoint
of the other, this does little to establish why such an alternative would be better in dealing with
the negative effects of resentment or ressentiment. In fact, one could easily argue that (as Nelson
indeed points out) resentment plays a vital role and that the Confucian system’s negation or
negotiation of it leads to more negative social outcomes than positive. Confucian ethics in
this sense seems no more ‘realistic’ or ‘nuanced’ than other systems. The fact that it needs no
recourse to a transcendental principle may make it preferable to systems that do, but there
are many contemporary Western systems that also do not see the need for such recourse.
More importantly, although Nelson discusses the asymmetry of the ethical claim upon a
person, in the sense of not expecting from others what one does expect from oneself, he does
not discuss in any detail the asymmetry of the roles that make up the backbone of Confucian
ethics, and it might well be these five relationships themselves and their asymmetrical
demands that require a justified resentment. And this may have been Nietzsche’s real concern.
My second concern is in Chapter 5, where Nelson discusses Heidegger in the context of
what does and does not count as ‘philosophy.’ Here I find Nelson not adequately portraying
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Heidegger, who is said to deny ‘philosophy’ to the East. The ‘Asiatic’ mentioned on page 145 is
clearly for Heidegger not the East-Asian, but Asia Minor and specifically refers to the Persian
threats that Ancient Greece had to ‘confront.’ This is really all about what ‘philosophy’ is.
When G. E. Moore pointed to the wall of books behind him and said philosophy was ‘what
these are about,’ he referred to an entire history of thinking with its own categories,
demands, and interests. In my opinion it is this history that Heidegger calls ‘philosophy,’
and it is exactly those categories and that history that he then continues to question. In that
sense it is a one-sided strategy to put Heidegger away as denying philosophy to the East.
He does, but he denies it that specific history and warns it against reducing its own history
to the ‘Begriffe’ of the West. Whether you call other ways of thinking ‘philosophy’ or not
then just becomes a question of definition. It is one-sided to put Heidegger into the camp
of those denying that there is anything of interest in the thoughts of non-Western traditions.
And it is one-sided to not mention in this chapter that Heidegger speaks of the possibility of
there being ‘greater thinkers’ outside the West, or not to mention that Heidegger seeks to over-
come what he calls philosophy. One has only to think of ‘The end of philosophy and the task of
thinking,’ or the positive connotations that identifying Eastern thought as ‘poetic thinking’
definitely has for Heidegger. Nelson does, throughout the book, speak of Heidegger as at
least having had some merit in the field of intercultural philosophy, but this section of
Chapter 5 is unfairly negative in suggesting that Heidegger, Derrida, and Rorty are Euro-
centric. If anything, their work has contributed tremendously to opening up philosophy to
its other in many different ways, but these thinkers have done so (1) in the acknowledgement
that philosophy can only do this by going back on and interrogating its own origins and domi-
nant history; (2) by warning against superficial remedies that would amount to taking over
‘Asian’ ways, or in the other direction taking over Western conceptuality; and (3) by highlight-
ing that the term ‘philosophy’ is used by them exactly to define and then condemn the isolat-
edness and limitations of Western style thinking. Nelson’s depiction here is too black and
white. But this is in the context of the ongoing debate on whether there is such a thing as
non-Western philosophy, which in my opinion is largely a definitional and political debate,
and not a philosophical one. Define philosophy as the history and accompanying conceptuality
of Western thought, and then other ways of thinking may indeed not fit that bill. Define it in
broader terms as a kind of questioning and reflection, then they may be included. It may well
be, as Nelson argues, that the second kind of definition is a better reflection of current needs
and reality. But calling Heidegger, Derrida, and Rorty Eurocentric because they employ the
first definition exactly in order to overcome the limitations inherent in the dominant approach
in Western thinking risks not portraying them correctly.
Maybe the two examples I have given in this otherwise outstanding book are reflective of an
overall noble as well as justifiable cause: to broaden the scope of philosophy to include other
ways of thinking. Yet we need to be careful in the claims we make in pursuing this cause.
Nelson’s Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought is a
great example of a book that shows us how such broadening has already taken place over cen-
turies of engagement, and of how we may perceive of intercultural philosophy moving
forward.
Steven Burik
Singapore Management University
stevenburik@smu.edu.sg
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